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Abstract In the course of decentralization, pastoral
communities in Namibia have had to find new ways to
share their most salient resource, water, and the costs
involved in providing it. Using data from sixty
communities, we examine (1) whether and to what extent
different sharing rules emerge, (2) how variations can be
explained, (3) how rules are perceived and influence
success, and (4) what economic consequences they have.
Our results reveal that either all members pay the same
(numerical equality) or payment is according to usage
(proportional equality). We find that although proportional
equality provides more success, the rule can only pertain
where the state maintains an active role. Simulations show
that where it does not prevail, wealth inequality is likely to
grow. These findings have political implications and
suggest that, in the context of the widespread
decentralization policies, the state should not withdraw if
it aims to ensure the success of common-pool resource
management and to fight poverty.
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INTRODUCTION
As the impact of humans on communal resources grows,
there is an increasing need to better understand how
resources can be governed sustainably. Elinor Ostrom has
identified eight principles that explain failure and success
in shared communal resource management. While the
significance of some of the original variables (e.g., moni-
toring, sanctioning) has been explored to some extent
during the last decades (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001,
2003; Dietz et al. 2003; Anderies et al. 2004; Pagdee et al.
2006; Ostrom 2009; Cox et al. 2010; Poteete et al. 2010;
Yang et al. 2013), comparably little is known about the
efficacy of different cost- and benefit-sharing agreements
(principle two in Ostrom’s list). At the same time, their
significance gains weight. Over the last decades, nation
states have increasingly withdrawn from local resource
governance. Instead, legislation and post-Rio policies in
the global South support community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) approaches, putting questions of
best practices center stage (Brosius et al. 1998; Leach et al.
1999; Ribot 1999; Cleaver 2012; Hall et al. 2014; Cleaver
and de Koning 2015).
Sharing agreements are based on notions of equality.
Equality is a functional relationship between two variables,
for example, time worked and payment received. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality: numerical
and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b–
1132b). With proportional equality, the payment received
varies according to the time each individual spends actually
working, whereas with numerical equality all those who
work are paid the same amount. Logically, the latter is a
special case of the former. The parable of the workers in
the vineyard offers an illustration (Matthew 20:1–16).
Here, the winegrower decided to pay all workers the same,
independent of when they began working during the day.
Thus, he established a relationship between the two vari-
ables at stake, ‘work’ and ‘pay’ which is not proportional
but numerical in Aristotle’s sense. Not surprisingly, those
who had been working since dawn complained.
In the case of communal resource governance, cost- and
benefit-sharing institutions must resolve the same funda-
mental issue (Mahanty et al. 2009). With cost sharing, the
appropriators have to agree whether they will each con-
tribute the same, or whether each individual will pay




according to the amount personally used. With benefit
sharing, community members must likewise decide whe-
ther all should benefit equally, or whether those who
invested more should also receive more.
The issue is central in Ostrom’s pioneering analysis
(principle two), and she concluded that institutions are
perceived to be fair if there is a ‘congruence between
appropriation and provision rules’ (Ostrom 1990, p. 90),
and that institutions perceived to be fair are more likely to
be successful. The observation was confirmed in a number
of case studies (Klooster 2000; Pomeroy et al. 2001;
Trawick 2001). In their comprehensive review of Ostrom’s
design principles, Cox et al. (2010) reformulated her sec-
ond principle, stating that ‘The benefits obtained by users
from a CPR [common-pool resource], as determined by
appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of
inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as
determined by provision rules.’ Based on their review of
the literature published since 1990, the congruence is
spelled out even more explicitly. From these theoretical
and empirical findings, we expect that (1) an approach
based on proportional cost/benefit sharing is more suc-
cessful in the long run and (2) that the rule which is per-
ceived to be fair is also more likely to prevail.
Currently, Namibia offers a unique opportunity to test
these expectations in an investigation of the emergence,
success, and consequences of sharing agreements on a
large scale. In the course of decentralization, rural com-
munities have had to find new ways to share their most
salient resource, water, and the costs involved in providing
it. In the arid environment of northwestern Namibia, pas-
toralism is the dominant livelihood strategy, and almost all
households own cattle and small stock. Until some 50 years
ago, most African pastoralists obtained water through
natural springs, surface water, and hand-dug wells
(McCabe 2004; Robinson 2009; Bollig 2013). Open water
sources were usually managed with adjoining pastures
(McCabe 2004). These conditions changed significantly in
the middle of the twentieth century under the influence of
the colonial state and its ‘modernization’ paradigm. Now,
in many parts of Africa, boreholes are drilled and
groundwater is withdrawn for household and livestock
consumption. Extensive pastures previously only viable
during or shortly after the rainy season when seasonal
rivers and filled pans were abundant now became available
year round. This ‘hydrological revolution’ allowed resi-
dents to sustain higher stocking numbers and altered
mobility patterns significantly, often laying the basis for a
more sedentary lifestyle (Picardi and Seifert 1976; Sobania
1988; Bollig 2013).
In northwestern Namibia, between 1960 and 1990 the
number of boreholes increased almost by a factor of ten
(Bollig 2013). Until independence in 1990, maintenance
costs for rural water supply were born by the South West
Africa administration under the jurisdiction of the colonial
South African state. As long as the state covered the costs
for establishing, running, and maintaining the infrastruc-
ture, little local coordination was required.
Starting in the mid 1990s, the implementation of
CBNRM has led to a drastic reconfiguration of the orga-
nizational and institutional landscape (Barnes et al. 2002;
Falk et al. 2009; Silva and Mosimane 2013; Bollig and
Menestrey Schwieger 2014). A shift toward self-gover-
nance meant turning ownership of and responsibility for
boreholes and rural water supplies over to user associa-
tions.1 As a result, hundreds of communities have had to
devise rules for sharing the costs and benefits involved. The
costs include diesel fuel to run engine pumps and paying
for necessary repairs. As previous work has shown, this
process has opened new paths to participation for rural
communities and their inhabitants. At the same time, put-
ting the economic responsibility in the hands of users
creates an additional financial burden, which is hard to
shoulder, especially for the poor (Falk et al. 2009). Even
the Namibian Government admitted self-critically, that
those costs can have negative effects and is considering
subsidization strategies for poor farmers (Namibia 2000;
Gildenhuys 2010). However, no further steps in this
direction have been taken.
While previous scholarly and policy papers have pointed
toward an increase in costs, it is not known to what extent
and why different institutional regimes emerge and what
distinct economic and social consequences different rules
are likely to have. To address both questions, a larger
sample of observations (communities), longitudinal data,
or simulations is appropriate. Such data were not available
prior to the study reported here. We explore for the first
time (1) whether and to what extent different sharing rules
emerge, (2) how possible variations can be explained, (3)
how different rules are perceived and hence influence
success in community water management, and (4) what
economic consequences distinct rules are likely to have.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study area
The arid Kunene region is sparsely populated. Small com-
munities dot the vast landscape and, on average, they con-
tain 13.1 (SD 3.5) households with 13 (SD 9.3) household
1 At the organizational level, two bodies are established. The Water
Point Association (WPA) that usually includes all adult individuals
living in the place. The WPA appoints a governance board, the Water
Point Committee (WPC), which consists of five to seven members
and is responsible for managing the daily concerns (Namibia 2004).
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members each. In general, dependency on natural resources
is high. Pastoralism is the dominant subsistence strategy and
the pastoral livelihood is constrained by the environment,
most notably the low and unpredictable precipitation
(Bollig 2006; Schnegg et al. 2013). Annual rainfall varies
around 200–300 mm and occurs in summer, between
November and April (Schnegg and Bollig 2016). Under
these ecological constraints, more than 25–30 ha of land is
needed to sustain one head of cattle (Burke 2004). Water is
provided through boreholes, often drilled more than 100 m
deep. Today, the technology varies and in 80 percent out of
the 60 communities we study the pumps are powered by
diesel engines, whereas in 20 % solar panels drive electric
motors. In the course of decentralization, the technological
infrastructure of the boreholes was renewed and is compa-
rably good across the communities we study.2 While the
techncial running costs of solar panels are lower, they must
be guarded against theft and repairs are more expensive. A
head of cattle drinks about 27 l a day, whereas goats/sheep
need only 2.2 l (Wilson 2007, p. 60f). For comparison, if the
water is not piped to a house humans use about 20 l of water
during the dry season (Linke 2015). With herds often
exceeding 50 animals per household, largely cattle, the
amount of water used for animals is thus significantly higher
than human consumption.
Livestock possession is unequally distributed in Kunene
and other parts of Namibia (Schnegg et al. 2013). We find
in almost all communities at least one household that owns
more than 100 cattle and we equally find one, and often
more, owning less than 10 (mean LSU3 = 79.08,
SD = 75.07, min = 2.33, max = 355.66). The Gini coeffi-
cient for livestock possessions per household, the most
important economic asset, is 0.49. This coefficient falls in
the range of what Falk et al. (2009) reported for other
communities and is much higher than the income Gini of
most European countries where it varies between 20 and 30
(UNDP 2014).
In terms of ethnicity, the study area is diverse. While
most people in the northern-most region of our study area
consider themselves as Ovahimba, the central region is
inhabited principally by Ovaherero, and the southern
communities by Damara/Nama. At the same time, most
communities are ethnically mixed and we did not observe
any effects between the main ethnic group in an area and
the ways the water sharing process was experienced and
managed.
In relatively small communities, people interact fact to
face, and typically over 80 percent of the members of each
community are related by kinship (Schnegg and Linke
2015). Within kinship networks, elder people typically
occupy a special position. They possess most livestock, the
central economic asset in pastoral communities. Livestock
not only symbolize wealth and status, but also transfer
directly into patron–client relationships, when, for exam-
ple, cattle are lent to poorer relatives who herd them in
exchange for the milk the cattle give.
In the course of decentralization, community-based
management strategies are introduced in the communities
by state officials. Rules and procedures follow a general
script and clear recommendations about how to manage
groundwater are given (Namibia 2006). Since the stimulus
induced by decentralization was by and large the same
throughout the research area, and technological, ecological,
and socio-economic variables show little variation across
the communities we study, the situation offered a unique
opportunity to study the evolution of institutions from a
comparative perspective.
Ethnographic data
The data analyzed here were collected by a team of
anthropologists between 2010 and 2012 (M. Bollig, M.
Schnegg, Th. Kelbert, D. Menestrey, Th. Linke, K. Gradt) as
part of a German Research Council (DFG)-funded research
project LINGS (Local institutions in globalized societies).
The two principle investigators, M. Schnegg and M. Bollig,
have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the region
since 1994 (M. Bollig) and 2002 (M. Schnegg) respectively,
and are responsible for the overall design and comparative
analysis of the data. In the first phase of the current field-
work, three anthropologists (D. Menestrey, Th. Linke, K.
Gradt) stayed for roughly 1 year between 2010 and 2011 in
seven communities in the southern (Fransfontein), central
(Otwani), and northern (Okangwati) parts of the research
area to gain an in-depth understanding of processes entailed
in negotiating and crafting new institutions through daily
routines. During this time, all 80 households were inter-
viewed about their social and economic livelihoods,
including economic possessions and social networks.
Comparative evidence from sixty communities
After an initial analysis of the ethnographic data collected
during 2010 and 2011, we returned to the field in late 2012
to conduct the ‘upscaling’ research we had designed to
study the distribution of some of the phenomena found in
the community ethnographies. Since our study treats
communities as cases, it is challenging to collect relatively
large numbers of observations that permit meaningful
2 In some parts of southern Kunene, infrastructural problems are
more common than in the northern part and are mainly caused by
elephant herds; communities are supported by NGOs and state
authorities to prevent destruction and undertake the necessary repairs.
3 Small and large stock are combined into one measure, livestock
units (LSU), whereas a head of cattle equals one LSU and small stock
(goat, sheep) one sixth.
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comparisons. To facilitate this requirement, we designed an
interview guide to elicit information at the community
level. For geographical areas of approximately 250 km2
around Fransfontein, Otwani, and Okangwati, all commu-
nities were interviewed. We can thus treat the data as a
complete sample for those three areas. We decided against
a representative sample of the entire Kunene region due to
its size, bad road infrastructure, logistical constraints, and
the lack of a list of communities that could serve as a
sampling frame. In addition, our approach allowed us to
make use of the fact that fieldworkers were already known
and trusted in the target areas.
The research protocol contained three sections. First, we
elicited the rules of water management and the composition
of community-based organizational structures for water
governance in the community. Each interview took place in
public and included both female and male informants,
some of whom were active in the water point committee.
The second and third sections dealt with the success of the
water management and the conflicts communities had
experienced or observed. Since those questions are more
confidential, interviews were done in private, aiming at a
sample of males and females of different age groups and
from different economic positions. In total, we researched
sixty communities. Since information remains incomplete
for some of them, the number of communities included in
the analysis is sometimes lower than that.
All group interviews were taped and two independent
interview protocols were written by the main researcher
and his/her assistant. Discrepancies were resolved there-
after. The data were entered in MySQL database, designed
for the project. The coding was done by the principal
investigators in collaboration with the researchers.
The measurement of success derives directly from the
questions posed and is coded on an ordinal three-point
scale. To measure the involvement of the state, we use two
indicators. During the interview, we collected two types of
information. First, the frequency and purpose of visits by
state officials in the community during the last 2 years. If
the state officials had visited the community at least once
during the last year for consultancies and activities other
than urgent repairs of broken infrastructure, we took this as
an indication of more than average state involvement.
Since CBNRM and the decentralization strategy are highly
standardized, we did not observe any variations in the type
of rules recommended. Generally, state officials try to push
communities in certain directions above all concerning the
payment schemes. Second, our ethnographic observations
have shown that if employees of the ministry or commis-
sioned NGOs lived in the communities at issue, the impact
of the state was significantly stronger, because those people
typically wanted their communities to be flagship cases for
the state’s mission and ideology (see below). For the
analysis, we coded the state involvement to be above
average, if either of the two indicators was given.
RESULTS
Cost- and benefit-sharing arrangements
The decentralization process in Namibia is carried out by
extension officers from the regional authorities (Directorate
of Rural Water Supply, DRWS) and/or NGOs contracted
by the government (Falk et al. 2009; Bollig and Menestrey
Schwieger 2014; Schnegg and Bollig 2016). To standardize
the process, a ‘Handbook for Water Point Committees’ was
developed and distributed to the NGO and state represen-
tatives administering the process on the local level
(Namibia 2006). The handbook and related documents
describe the process to be taken step by step in eleven
sections and propose institutional solutions to the com-
munity. Sharing the costs of water is one of the most salient
problems in water governance. Since most pumps operate
with diesel, the price of water is largely determined by the
amount and price of diesel required for pumping it. In line
with the idea that water is an economic good, the hand-
books spell out in session 5 ‘Managing WPA Finance’:
‘‘Recommended is a rate per head of large or small stock,
each member paying a certain rate per head of large or
small [stock] accordingly, as to raise enough money to
sustain the water point’’ (Namibia 2006, p. 8). We refer to
this arrangement as the proportional rule.
During the process of implementation, emerging insti-
tutional arrangements are negotiated with representatives
of the ministry or contracted NGOs. For doing so, the
representatives visit the communities and call for meetings
during which the many pertinent questions, e.g., access,
sanctions for violations of the rules agreed, and—often
most importantly—payment schemes are discussed. State
officials explain in qualitative interviews that in recent
years they especially focus on payment schemes and rec-
ommend the proportional rule (Linke 2015). Since dis-
cussions about the payment scheme are typically
conflictive, the process often requires a number of meetings
that stretch over months. During the meetings, state rep-
resentatives take an active role. They go through the sec-
tions of the above-mentioned handbook and sensitize the
communities to the issues they have to resolve. Often, the
moderator uses flip charts to summarize his or her input
and that of the communities. At the end, a consensus is
fixed in two documents: the ‘constitution’ and the ‘man-
agement plan’ containing information about the payment
scheme.
In the communities we studied, two types of rules were
applied. Among the fifty-six water management groups for
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which we have information, 25 (44.6 %) agreed that indi-
viduals paid fees according to the number of livestock they
owned (e.g., 2 N$ per head of cattle and 1 N$ per goat/
sheep per month). Thus, the more water one uses, the more
they pay. This fits the notion of proportional equality. In
addition, seven communities (12.5 %) used an attenuated
form in which the rich paid more, but not exactly in pro-
portion to the number of their livestock.4 However, in 24
communities (42.9 %) we found an institutional regime in
which all households paid the same (e.g., 100 N$ per
household per month), and which was therefore based on
the principle of numerical equality.5 Thus, only about half
of the observations confirm the existing literature that
proportional equality is likely to emerge (Ostrom 1990,
p. 90; Klooster 2000; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Trawick 2001;
Cox et al. 2010).
Before we offer an explanation why, we want to rule out
two common alternative hypotheses: technology and a
‘‘majority cost/benefit vote’’ (Ostrom 1990; Anderies et al.
2004). Whereas Anderies et al. (2004) have proposed that
technology plays a central role for institutional design, we
find a very low and non-significant relationship between
the technological infrastructure (solar/diesel) and the pay-
ment regime (phi = 0.155, P = 0.244). Alternatively,
Ostrom has argued that institutions tend to develop in ways
that serve the majority (Ostrom 1990, p. 193). In our case,
that would mean that households opt for the solution under
which they pay less (given their number of animals) and
that the community ends up with the solution that serves
most households best. As a test of this hypothesis reveals,
in most communities (88.9 %), the majority of households
would profit financially from a proportional rule. Thus, the
hypothesis of a rational majority vote can hardly explain
why in a great many communities numerical equality is
reality.
The account we provide instead is formulated on the
basis of our ethnographic work and includes four factors.
Of those, three apply in all communities and favor a
numerical rule. Only the last factor, the involvement of the
state, makes a difference, as the statistical analysis reveals.
Micro-politics of water
Administration costs
To establish and maintain a proportional rule is more costly
than a numerical rule. Most importantly, it requires
counting animals. Counting livestock is difficult. Counting
individual animals of small stock in large herds from dif-
ferent owners flowing toward a well is nearly impossible.
In addition, there are cultural taboos against counting
livestock, and people complain that counting livestock
brings about bad luck (Bollig 2006). In general and across
all communities, this favors numerical equality.
Wealth and bargaining power
Not surprising, wealthy herd owners oppose a proportional
rule and opt for numerical equality (Menestrey Schwieger
2015). Often, this is justified by pointing out that the higher
burden on the poor is balanced out through other exchan-
ges, when, for example, Hermann explains to us: ‘‘Jorries
who is having fifty cows is not only keeping them for the
water, but he is also taking milk from his animals and gives
this to you so you can prepare some porridge and eat it with
the milk.’’ In contrast, most poor households argue like
Justus who reasons: ‘‘There is now one house that we call
Herbert Humbandi’s house. This house has a lot of cattle,
maybe, over 300. [With the numerical rule] this household
oppresses the others who have only small stock. I have only
8 cows. And then, I have to pump water, for that one who
has 300 as well. For the whole month. This is very difficult.
[…]. So that’s why we say, if you have a lot of cattle, you
have to pump more.’’6
In the regional cultural context and across all three
research sites, social status and bargaining power strongly
correlate with economic status (Pauli 2011). Elderly men
commonly occupy the positions at the top of this ladder.
These positions are sustained by the material basis of the
economy, cattle ownership, which is, as we have seen,
unevenly distributed. Across all communities, there is
ample ethnographic evidence that those who own more use
their bargaining power to push for an institutional regime
that is favorable to them (i.e., numerical equality). The
nature of social ties is key to understanding why they often
succeed (Schnegg and Linke 2015).
Multiplexity of ties and norms of sharing
The communities each consist of fewer than 20 households,
and people interact in multiple ways and roles. Thus,
sharing water can hardly be separated from the remaining
social and economic aspects of life. People also interact as
kin, as lenders and borrowers of animals, and as providers
of other resources (e.g., car rides, advice, ritual services).
Thus, water is only one resource in a larger sharing
arrangement and a moral model exists that short-term
imbalances in one domain will equal out across all types of
transfers and time (Schnegg and Bollig 2016).
4 The following analysis treats the six cases with an attenuated
proportional rule as cases of a proportional rule.
5 While the rules differ, the total amount of money collected does not
differ significantly with the institutional regime. 6 Interview conducted by M. Schnegg, 20.3.2014 (Fransfontein area).
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Furthermore, sharing norms foster a common belief that
every household of the community needs to contribute to
sustain collective goods and show his cooperative com-
mitment (Linke 2015; Schnegg 2015). Given this inter-
connectedness in multiple networks, it is practically
impossible for the less wealthy to force those who are
better off to pay more than the rest if the latter refuse
(Schnegg and Linke 2015). They readily respond that even
if they pay less for water, they provide many other goods
for the community and especially the poor (e.g., trans-
portation, milk). Again, this works in favor of numerical
equality.
The Role of the state
Given the three dynamics just described, we would expect
all communities to end up with a numerical equality rule.
To understand why this is not the case, we have to take the
state and its agents into account. As we have seen, and as it
is expressed in the handbook and in qualitative interviews
with extension officers, the state has an explicit preference
for proportional equality. While the state does not provide
any material incentives to apply proportional equality or
penalize communities that opt for numerical rule, its rep-
resentatives clearly state in public meetings that propor-
tional equality is what the state favors and what they
perceive to be just and fair. Unsurprisingly then, a first
examination of those thirty-one cases that establish pro-
portional equality reveals that in these cases Ministries and
NGOs maintain strong involvement in the local water
governance through regular visits and support.
An interview with Christa, who works for the Ministry
of Agriculture, Water & Forestry and is responsible for a
large number of water points, shows the state at work.
When I confronted her with my observation that many
communities switch to a numerical regime she responded:
‘‘It is not fair. But as soon as we turn our back the com-
munity big men come and tell the rest what to do.’’ In the
course of the interview, she repeatedly states how hard it is
for her, the official from the Ministry, to implement the rule
in the community where she is farming herself. Asked
where the proportional rule is actively working, she starts
talking about the community Duurwater7 where an active
young women is the chairperson. To support her, Christa
drove early in the morning, when the cattle drink, to
Duurwater to count the animals with the other committee
members. ‘‘Then, we approached the poor households and
talked to them about the different rules and encouraged
them to stand up and talk in the meeting. In the meeting we
would support them.’’8
Taking the four dynamics together allows us to formu-
late a hypothesis: communities will only apply proportional
equality when the state actively supports the poor and their
interests. In all other cases, the three social dynamics
described above favor numerical equality. As the correla-
tion between the two variables, state interventions, and
existence of proportional equality reveals (phi = -0.478,
P = 0.000), the involvement of the state can explain the
institutional outcome to a significant degree. In contrast, in
communities where the state is only weakly involved the
first three dynamics analyzed above are dominant and
numerical equality prevails.
Levels of success
We have outlined when and why different equality regimes
evolve. Since the groundwater in northwestern Namibia
comes from aquifers fed in Angola, ecological success
cannot be measured locally. We, therefore, base our anal-
ysis of the success of the water management regimes on
social indicators developed in cooperation with communi-
ties. These include (1) satisfaction with the rules, (2) sat-
isfaction with the work of the water point committee
(committee), (3) general level of satisfaction expressed
concerning cooperation in the community, and (4) the
general satisfaction with the water management in the
community.
Table 1 shows how these variables and the sharing rules
correlate. In general, the analysis reveals clearly that pro-
portional equality (coded as ‘1’ in the dichotomous vari-
able) leads to higher levels of satisfaction and success. All
correlations are positive and significant. While the rela-
tionship is highest with the rules themselves, it holds true
for the satisfaction with the committee work, and the
cooperation in the community in an attenuated form as
well. Above all, the general level of satisfaction with the
water management in the community correlates positively
with proportional equality. While this could have to do
with higher reliability and better ‘‘performance’’ of bore-
holes that are managed under proportional equality, there is
no correlation between the sharing rule and the suscepti-
bility of the technological infrastructure and thus water
access or supply (phi = -0.01, non-significant). Combined
with our ethnographic observations, this indicates that
success is mostly judged socially.
Economic consequences
As we have indicated, livestock is unequally distributed.
Thus, with numerical equality in a hierarchical setting,
where all individuals pay the same, the institutional regime
must have economic consequences that diverge from
equality. To explore these in depth, we developed a
7 Name is a synonym.
8 Interview conducted by M. Schnegg, 25.3.2014 (Fransfontein area).
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simulation model. The model starts with the distribution of
livestock that we found among 80 households for which we
did detailed livestock counts. Small and large stock are
aggregated into one measure, livestock units (LSU), for
which a head of cattle equals one LSU and small stock
(goat, sheep) one sixth (Schnegg et al. 2013). For each
month, we assume that herds grow by 2 % and that under
numerical equality a household has to pay a constant water
fee (200 N$). In order to pay, households sell animals at
4000 N$ per LSU. These numbers reflect local conditions.
To explore how numerical equality affects different groups,
we distinguish between three economic positions: the poor
(\20 LSU), those moderately well-off ([20 LSU\100
LSU), and the rich ([100 LSU). The classification is based
on wealth-ranking interviews and emic understanding of
economic stratification. Among the 80 households, 21 were
poor, 35 were moderately well-off, and 24 were rich.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for the different
economic groups over a period of 100 months. Figure 1a–c
reports the proportion of water used by an average
household in any of the three groups. While all households
pay an equal amount to use the water, the amount used
varies significantly between groups, and also changes with
time. As the results reveal, at the beginning the share of
water used by a rich household was already almost 15
times that used by its poor neighbor. That means that they
get 15 times more water for the same contribution made.
Over time, the amount of water used by the wealthy
increases further, so after 100 months it is 18 times what
the poor consumed. Since all households paid the same, the
water consumption of the rich was subsidized by the other
two groups—most significantly by those who owned the
least.
Figure 1d investigates the wealth effects of these
dynamics and shows the resulting Gini coefficient for
livestock ownership for the population of 80 households.
As the results reveal, the coefficient rises, indicating, ce-
teris paribus, that inequality increases. Thus, the poor and
those in between not only subsidize the day-to-day water
consumption of the richer part of the population, but also
sponsor their future wealth.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Even though the saliency of sharing rules has been rec-
ognized for some time, we know comparably little about
what leads to the implementation of specific rules and what
effects they have. Namibia currently offers the opportunity
to investigate both relationships on a relatively large scale
(Bollig and Menestrey Schwieger 2014; Schnegg and
Linke 2015; Schnegg and Bollig 2016). To compare cost-
and benefit-sharing arrangements, we introduce the dis-
tinction between numerical and proportional equality.
Previously, research has assumed that in cases where
benefits are unequally distributed, proportional equality is
likely to prevail simply because it is generally perceived to
be fair and would be beneficial for resource management
(Ostrom 1990). Perhaps surprisingly, our results show that
this is not always the case.
Proportional equality is considered fair by the largest
part of the population. Equally, the correlation between
different indicators of satisfaction and the rule type indi-
cates that communities with proportional equality are more
satisfied that is more successful. Hence, in terms of suc-
cess, we confirm previous research that identified propor-
tional equality to be more beneficial to the community as a
whole (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010). At the same time, it
often does not prevail. To explain why, we need to take the
micro-politics of water governance into account. Those
involve three salient intra-community dynamics (adminis-
tration cost; wealth and bargaining power; multiplexity of
ties and general norms of sharing) which all push the
institutional regime toward numerical equality. These
findings support recent work showing that natural resource
management is embedded in past, present, and future social
relationships (Cleaver 2012; De Koning and Cleaver 2012;
Hall et al. 2014; Cleaver and de Koning 2015; Schnegg and
Linke 2015).
At the same time, the state plays a decisive role. How-
ever, its role is not restricted to transferring global models
of resource governance to national legislations. Through its
bureaucrats and contracted NGOs, it remains an active
agent in daily negotiations at the local level. Where the
Table 1 Correlation between different indicators of perceived success and sharing agreements. The level of success was coded as follows: ‘1’
(unhappy or very unhappy), ‘2’ (it works okay), and ‘3’ (happy or very happy). Due to missing data, in all four correlations the N is lower than
the total number of communities captured (60)
Level of success
Institutional rules Committee work Cooperation in the community Generally satisfied
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Numerical 9 0 5 10 10 10 9 0 5 10 1 10
Proportional 1 2 18 3 3 3 1 2 18 3 3 24
Rank biserial correlation (rbc) rbc = 0.559, P = 0.000 rbc = 0.427, P = 0.017 rbc = 0.406, P = 0.006 rbc = 0.389, P = 0.003
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state remains actively involved, proportional equality is
significantly more likely to be applied and to prevail.
The two equality rules have different effects. With propor-
tional equality, everyone pays for their water usage by amount.
Thus, the rule will not change the distribution of wealth in the
community. By contrast, and as simulations reveal, numerical
equality has far-reaching economic and social consequences.
Both the poor and themoderatelywell-off subsidize the current
water consumptionof the rich. In the long run, they also assist in























































































Fig. 1 Simulation results. a Percentage of water used by an average poor household under a numerical equality rule over a period of 100 months.
The percentage of the overall water consumption is very low and decreases. b Percentage of water used by an average middle-class household
under a numerical equality rule over a period of 100 months. The percentage of the overall water consumption is low and decreases. c Percentage
of water used by an average rich household under a numerical equality rule over a period of 100 months. The percentage of the overall water
consumption is high and increases. d Gini coefficient applied to the distribution of livestock among all households. The Gini coefficient rises
considerably during the 100-month period
588 Ambio 2016, 45:581–590
123
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
www.kva.se/en
These findings have political implications. Over recent
decades, nation states have increasingly withdrawn from
local resource management and self-governance (CBNRM)
has become a guiding principle of many development
efforts—the idea that turning ownership and responsibility
over to local communities will empower them and help
eradicate poverty (Ribot 1999; Blaikie 2006; Ribot et al.
2006). Left alone, we find that the rich typically succeed in
establishing numerical equality, much to their own eco-
nomic advantage (for a comparable observation see also
Kumar 2002, p. 777). We demonstrate that these policies
can have unintended economic consequences, especially in
widening the gap between rich and poor. Only if the state
remains in an active role can it ensure economic sustain-
ability and help eradicate poverty.
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